Safety and environmental constraints on space applications of fusion energy by Roth, J. Reece
:1
!
t
N91°22149 1
SAFETY AND ENVIRONMEN LAL CONS'I'RAINTS
ON .q_:Al'.l,'. AI'P_ if_.TIONS OF FUS!QN L-_i,_r_r_v
by
Prof. J. Reeca Roth
DeparUnent of Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of Tennessee
Knoxville, Tennessee 37996-2100
(615) 974-4446
Abstract
This paper examines some of the constraints on fusion reactions, plasma
confinemeni, systems, and fusion reactors that are int, ended for such space-
related missions as manned or unmanned operations in near earth orbit,
interplanetary missions, or requirements of '_-- SDI program. Of the many
constraints on space power and propulsion systems, those arising from safety
and environmental considerations are emphasized in this paper since these
co_siderations place severe constra;uts on some fusion systems and have not
been adequately treated in previous studies.
Introduction
It is very probable that oniy nuclear fission or nuclear fusion energy will
be capable of sat, isfying space-related requirements for mere than a few
hundred kilowat'cs of steady state electrical power. Early work at. the NASA
Lewis Research Center on fusion propulsion systems between }958 and 1978
[refs. 1 and 2] examined _.he applic, ion of steady state fu3ion reactors,
generating several hundred megawat_. , thermal power, to direct fusio:_
rockets for manned _nterplanetary missions. More recent design studies of
fission and fusion space electrical power systems [refs. 3 t,o 6j have addressed
the long-term ,'__ds of the strategic defense init(ative (SDI) program, for which
a requirement of 1 to 10 megawatts of steady state electrical p_,wer is
anticipated, w!th a further possible requirement of up to several hundred
megawatts of burst _lectncal p(.wer for permds of hours. A preliminary
report on adwnced fusion power for sp:_ : applications of interest to the
Department of Defense has recently been published by the National Academy
of _ci ::nces, ur.der the sponsorship of the Air Force Studies Board [ref. 7]. _ihe
data in this report indicate that fusion power and propulsion systems may
have a lower specific mass (kilogra_s per kilowatt of electrical power) than
that. anticipated for fission-electric systems.
Of the many constraints on fusion space power and propulsion system,%
_.hose arising from safety and environmental considerations will be
emphasized in this paper, since these considerations place servere constraints
on some fusion :ystems. and they have not been adequately trea*.ed in previous
stud'es. This paper first discusses the safety and environmental factors which
affect the selection o_ fusionahte fuels, followed by a considera _n of fack_rs
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which affect the choice of confinement concept. Finally, seme conclusions are
drawn, on the basis of safety and environmental considerations, about the
choice of magnetic vs inertial fusion; the best apparent choice of fusion
reaction; and the constraints which magnetic containment concet)ts ml_._t
_ai,i_fy for space applications.
Safety ann Environmental Factors
Affecting Fusion Fuel Se!ection
Tritium in Space
f Whatever the merits of the DT reaction for electric utility pewerplant
i reactors [ref. 8], the constraints of the space environment, to be discussed
below, make it desirable to consider other fusion reactions. Utilization of the
DT, DD, or ca_alyzed DD reactions would necessitate the use of radio!ogically
i significant amounts of tritium in space, ap.d one must ask whether the risks of
1 doing so can be reduced to acceptable levels.
i A benchmark for lar_e-scale radiological accidents was established by
; the Chernobyl nuclear accident of April, 1986 [refs. 9, 10]. The approximate
radioactive source terms and inventories associated with this accident are
i listed in the first column of Table I. As a consequence of this accident,
; apprcximately 50 megacuries of biologq.cally inert noble gases, mostly krypton
and xenon, were released into the atmosphere. An addit;onal 50 megacuries of
biologically active fission prodm_ts were released arid spread ever a large
portion of the Eurasian continent. It is instructive to compare these
inventories with the radioactive in,_entories associa_d with the Starfire DT
tokamak reactor [ref. 11], a gigawatt level powerplant fusion reactor. The
Starfire reacter had a total tritium inventory of 11.6 kilograms, which is
approximately 110 megacuries of volatile radieactive material. This is more
than twice as great as the biologically significant (n,:.n noble gas) radioactivity
released during the Chernobyl accident.
TABLE I
Fission and I)T Fusion Radioiogical 14_r_ C_mparison
1 GWE Operation for One Year
Starfire
Chernobyl T_¢_al OTTokamakReactor Characteristics Accident
Biologically Inert (noble) Gas _50 ........
Release, (MCi)
Biologically Active _50 ........
Radiation Release, (MCi)
Tritium Inventory (MCi) ........ l I 1
[ _IonvclatHe Core/Blanket 1500 .... 6140
Inventory (NC0
An'_ual Radioactive Wast'--'-_e .... 30-60 69
Production, Tonnes/Year
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By comparing inventoriesand sourceterms in Curies,itisintended to
provide an indication of relative public acceptability, public perceptioP, of
relative risk, and relative immediate consequences of an acciden*.. Such
_mmediate consequences include exposure of operatir.g staff and emergency
crews, the necessity of evacuating large areas, and other emergency measures
taken for public safety. Long-term consequences such as genetic o. somatic
damage to individuals or populations would require, in addition, consideration
of the relative biological effectiveness (RBE) of each species released, along
with its environmental pathway and source term. While the relative
biological effectiveness may be useful for assessing the long-term cGnsequences
of a particular accident, it probably has little impact on the social acceptance of
a nuclear technology prior to its introduction.
If a DT reactor were used in space, the penalties associated with a
lithium breeding blanket for the tritium w()uld probably be so great that
tritium fuel would be supplied f_om _ound-based sources. In a direct fusion
rocket, or in a fusion-electric sy_ _cm based on a direct converter_ it w,.'ll be very
difficult to recover the unburned tritium, and it is thereforeprudent to assume
that all unburned tritium is lost to space and unavailable for reinjection into
the reactor. Since the burnup fraction [ref. 12] of tioitium will likel(/be in the
range from 5 to 30% for DT reactors, much more tritium will be required to fuel
a reactor than is actually burned to produce electrica] power or propulsiGn.Depending on power level, from 10 MWT to 1GWT, a space power or p_,opulsion
system might use from approximately 0.133 kilogram to 3 kilograms of tritium
per day. Safety considerations make it necessary to be concerned both about
lifting this tritJum fuel into orbit in the first place, and then assuring that it
does not re-enter the atmospher_
Theparticles trapped in the earth's magnetosphere are supplied by the
solar wind, and consist mostly of hydrogen with a small admixture of helium
and other elements. If all of the hydrogen trapped in the magnetosphere were
liquified: the liquid hydrogen would approximately fill an olympic-sized
swimming pool. Thus, the total amount of matter in the magnetosphere is not
•,ery great, and one must be seriously concerned about the effects of adding
charged particles or significant amounts of additional matter t_ that already
present in the magnetosphere. The oraount of matter iri the ma_;metosphere is
comparable to the prope!l,.nt exhausted by many propulsion systems as they
move thr.mgh it. Since most particles trapped in the magnetosphere
eventually find their way into the earth's atanosphere, one must be concerned
about the possible effects of inject,:ng tritium ions in the magnetosphere, which
are loter precipitated into the atmosphere by MHD instabilities.
If tritium or any other radioactive nuclear fuel is used in space, one mu_t
address the foliow:'ng accident scenarios: a) a Challenger-type accident in
which the space sh_,_ttle ferrying the tritium into orbit blows up in the
atmosphere and releases the tritium invent.orl¢; b) re-entry of the fuel
inventory into the atmosphere as a result of atmospheric drag cr an
unintended change .;n tne orbital elements of a spacecraft with a fusion reactor
on board; or c) leakage of unburned fusion.o; le fuel into t:.-', atmosphere by
such routes as trapping of its ions in the magnetosphere, followed by auroral
precipitation in the earth's atmosphere.
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Probably the single most importart factor in optimizing a space power orpropulsion sys_m is to minim[_e the initial mass that must be placed in earth
orbit, since transportation into orbit is very expensive, in consequence, there
is a strong _emptation to omit shielding to the mazimum extent possible, in
order to conserve mass. The 14 MeV neutrons produced by the DT reaction
require at least a meter ofshielding to be slowed down. A spectrum of blanket
designs is possible, ranging from full shielding to a bare reactor. In very
unusual circumstances, a partially or fully shielded neutronic reactor might be
lighter than a bare aneutronic reactor, but this appears unlikely in view of the
mass penalty of radiators and ener_y handling equipment required to deal
w]*_ thermal energy deposited xn the shield. Here, we assess the
environmental consequences of the limiting case, a bare reactor.
It has not a_,ways been realized that unshielded fluxes of neutrons,
charged particles, and x-rays can pose a serious environmental hazard over
surprisingly large distances from an unshielded source. Let us consider a bare,
unshielded fusion reactor, and focus on the consequences of an o.nshielded flux
of neutrons from such a reactor. The flux of neutrons, _bL, from a point source of
S neutrons per second at a distance R e is given by
S
dpt"- neutrons/m 2- _c. (1)2
4 n RI.
The relationship between the power lost in the form of neutrons, PN, the total
fusion power, p_., and the fraction of the power in neutrons, fN, is given by
|'N = fNl'_ *'' (2)
while the power in charged particles, Pc, is given in tel_ns of the total fusion
power produced by
1'(: : (i - rN) I"r (3)
Combining Equations 2 and 3, the relation between the neutron power, the
power in charged particles, and the fr_ction of the power in the form of
neutrons is given by
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FM J)('
PN = -. (4)
1- fN
The source term from an unshielded fusion reactor generating neutrons
is given in terms of the total neutron power, PN, in megawatts, the electronic
charge, e = 1.60 x 1049 Coulomb, and the energy ENof the individual neutron
m MeV as follows,
PN(MW) fNP (MW)
S - - neutrons/_c,
e EN(MeV) (1 - fN)eEN(MeV) (5)
where Equation 4 has been substituted for the neutron: power in Eqluation 5.
Substituting Equation 5 into Equation 1, and solving for the standoff distance
R., one obtains
fNPc(MW) , if2
RI = [4neqbl(l-7-_EN(MeV, ] meters., (6)
It is of it)terest to calculate the standoff distance based on radiological
safety considerations for a t,',ical fusion propulsion system, The design
studies of references 1 ana _;"indicate that a propulsion system utilizinlg a
d_rect fusion rocket mi_" . require about 200 megawatts of charged particle
power in the exhaust jet. For pure DT fusion the fraction of the "energy
released in the form ofneutron_ is f. = 0.80, and the neutron energy ENis 14.1
MeV. The occupationally acceptabl_ safe dose for 40 hour per week exiiosure to
MeV neutrm,s is approxunately 10 neutrons per square centimeter per second,
or 10s neutrons per ._quare meter per second. Since such a fusion propulsion
system would start out orbiting the earth, the natural unit of length used to
measure the stapdoffdistance is the earth radius, R = 6378 kilometers.
The neutron fraction, neutron energy, and safe standoff distance under
the above assumptions is shown for an unshielded fusion reactor with isotropic
neutron production in Table II for 5 fusion reactions. The safe distance, beyond
which the neutron fluxes are below the occupational standard, are also given
in earth radi!. Clearly, an unshielded fusion reactor will generate such a large
neutron flux that no unshielded person or thing can approach safely within a
very lacge distance of it. If one were to use a more demanding standard, like
10% of the background radiation level, for example, these standoff distances
would be still larger. It should be m;ed that the same consideration applie_
both unshielded magnetic and inertial fusion reactors, since the average of 200
!61
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imegawatt_ for an unshielded pr_.pulsion system is based on the a_.ve£a__ power
required for interplanetary mlss]ox,_.
TABLE I1
SAFE DISTANCE FROM UNSHIELDED FUSION REACTOR
_.'ITH ISOTROPIC NEUTRON PRODUCTION
m l,.
NEUTRON NEUTRON SAFE
ENERGY, E DISTANCE, R/Ro
I_ACTION FRACTION, _ MeV R,KM
n
•.r)T 0,80 " 14.07 16,800 2.6
DD 0.336 2.45 14,300 2.2
CAT DD 0.38 8.26 8,600 1.4
DaHe 0.02 2.45 2,900 0.45
p6Li 0.05 1.75 5,500 0.86
Assumptions:
a) 200 MW of charged particle power
b) RadiologicallysafedoseforcontinuousexposuretoMeV neutrons:10
neutrons/cm2-aec
c) EarthradiusR0= 6378km
Some oftheenvironmentalhazardsposedby an unshieldedfusionreactor
inspaceare summarized inFigure I. These hazards couldincludethe effects
ofneutrons,energeticreacticnproducts;unburned fuelions,electrons,and X_
ray radiation.At leastsome ofthesehazards would resultfrom the use of a
bare reactor,regardlessofthe fusionreactionused. These forms of radiation
could load up the magnetosphere with energeticcharged particles;cause
damage tounmanned satellitesinearthorbit;d_mage otherspacecraft,as in
an exploratoryfleetor a space shuttle;itcould affec_individualsin earth-
orbitingsatellitesor in high flying _ircraft;the radiationcould activate
atmosphericgasesby directinteraction;and at opticalfrequencies,radiation
could affect the work of individuals such _ .,_ronomers at high altitudes or
even at sea level.
The detrimental environmental effects of an un_hielded fusion reactor
' are noL limited to low earth orbit. If such an unshielded fusion reactor or
propulsion system were to approach anotherplanet or satellite, the unshielded
radiation could lead to activation of _ne surface and loss of scientific data. It
could affect a manned scientific station or colony. Unshielded radiation on a
target planet or satellite s_,rface could alter or er:,se the cumulative effect of
eons of integrated informauon from the solar wind, cosmic rays, or other long-
term surface interaction r 'ocesses.
The above considerations make it clear that neutrons should be shielded
and not allowed to escape directly into space. If this is so, then their the, real
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energymust be disposeaof. In space,theonlyway in which an isolated
spacecraftcan disvoseofwaste h,_ati_hy ._a;o+,,..,,_-_ .L.............
radia_)rs then represent a significant mass penalty which must be paid to
accommodate the preser, ce .)f neutrons. These considerations suggest s_rongly
that the best way of avoiding what must be either a safety hazard or a mass
penalty is to use fusion reactions which generate the minimum possible
amount of neutron, radiant, or thermal energy.
OAMAG{ 10 UN_N_O _ ._- - _ POSSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS OF
-_A_LLI_5 _,_t f _._FUSIGN 9ROPULSION SYSTEMS
re#f-
AIMOSP_RE . _ -- _ _L()AOING U? VAN ALL[M BELTS
_D_,_S ,. '"qH[_rc,[_,cCHA_C(Or,rtk:t[s
_X_r,N,ouat5 L,,'_(G .... "_'_, ],p/" bJE'3TRON$
"'_ '"*H _TITU _ ,_c9"_ ' . _V o-PA_TELE$
x. r,t, , _. ur.. " _ £L£CI'RON5
_t _1 '_ ATMOSPHERfC C,.'_SES FUSION ROCKEr /
I I I/ _ o_._,,v :.,c_ss,.
t,_l_] _ fl4OWIDUAL¢,IN HIGH- Lw_Aft tD(PLORATORY F_[I _,_'/_
/ _ "" '_TA.T!(3'N,C_COLONY ,'_I
-_" ./ / ' \_- / k J/
__ / _. ,.._l_U_L.,,_,_,* \ 47/--'
Neutronic Activation of Structure
Both fission and fusion reactors will activate +,heir shielding and
structure to some extent. In fission reactors, activation arises from fission
products and the interactior: of low energy (below 1 MeV) neutrons with the
core and shielding materials; in fu:,ion reactors, the activation arises from 14.1
or 2.45 MeV neutrons which activate the material of the first wall and blanket.
The magnitude of this activation is evident in the last line of Table I, where the
nonvolatile core or blanket inventory is listed for the Chernobyl reactor at the
time of the accident .on April 26, 1986 [ref. 9, 10] and for the Starfire DT
Tokamak after one year of operation [ref. 11]. These inventories were the
result of about a year of full power operation at 1 gJ_awatt of electrical power
output in each case. These inventories are, respectwely, about 30 times and
about 120 times the radioactive release of the Chernobyl accident, and are
clearly much too large to dump into the atn_ozphere. Thus, any fission or DT
fu¢ion reactor, once operated in space, may become a serious radiological
safety hazard apon re-er_try into the atmosphere.
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In low earth orbit, there is a narrow band of orbital altiL,,des within
which manned operations are possible. Below approximately 306 kilometers,
=_,.,,ov,,_,"'..... t. ,_ ,,a_ ,_ _u Large _:a_ me orolt oi a space station v,omd decal in a
relatively short period of time; above about 500 kilometers, radiation fluxes
from particles trapped in the magnetosphere are sufficiently high that
sustained manned operations are not possible. ParentheLically, it is not
generally realized that the Apollo astronauts acquired a whole body radiation
dose of 50 rods during one round trip through Lheearth's maga_etosphere. This
is approximately 1/10 of the L-50 fatal dose.
Beca.,se of Lhe hazard of the radioactive i:_vel}tory of fission or fusion
reactors, these reactors should be parked, after use, in a "nuclear safe orbit",
that is, an orbit that ia sufficiently high above the earth's surface that
; atmospheric drag will not cause the reactor to re-enter the atmosphere until
the longest-lived radionuclide cf any significance decays. For fission reacu)rs,
the lowest nuclear safe orbit is about 700 kilometers, tkus placing the parkin_
orbit tbr nuclear fission reac_:o beyond the 500 mile limit where mannea
operations are possible. The radionuclides in activated DT tokamak fusion
reactors are, in most blanket designs, net as long-lived as those of fission
reactors, and their nucl_.ar safe orbit may be somewhat lcwer than the 700
kilometers appropriate for fission reactors.
The fact that the nuclear safe orbit is likely to be above the altitude band
where manned operations are possible leaves open the possibility that a fission
or fusion reactor associated with a manned space station might reenter the
atmosphere. If it did so, the last line of Table I implies that an amount, in
Curies, of radioactive material could be released into the atmosphere by the
reentry process which would be about 30 times the Chernobyl release for a
gawatt fission reactor, and about 120 times the Chernobyl release for a DT
sion reactx)r comparable b3the Starfire tokamak.
Availability of Fusionable Fuels
Most fusionabte fuels are available for space applications in unlimited
quantities. The only two fusionable fuels which may be in short supply are
tritium and 3He. Tr(tium has a half-life for decay into aHe of 12.3 years,
'r-. 12-3YR 3lie + e (7)
and is not found to any significant extent in nature. SHe is a stable isotope of
helium, but is found with an isotopic abundance of only about one part in 106
on the surface of the earth.
Only a very limited number of fusion reactors will ever be required for
space applications, and their fueling requirements will be far smaller than, for
example, a ground-based fusion economy for the electric utilities. Thus, for
!64
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space applications, it becomes possible to consider sources of tritium and _Ite
which would not be feasible for gTound-based electric utility applications.
T ....... 1.,
l,, oe,_c, se_-eic ,lu_ penames wiii probably be associated with the
recovery of unburned tritium fuel for reinjection into the plasma, or with any
attempt to breed tritium on a space ,1chicle by the neutron-lithium breeding
reactions [ref. 12, page 202] which have been proposed for ground-based
electric utility DT powerplant reactors. The relatively small amount of
tritium required for space missions, compared to the much larger amounts
which might be needed in ground-based electric utility powerplants, should
make it possible to increase the tritium breeding ratio of ground-based
powerplants to an extent which will produce enough additiona! tritium for
space missions.
Because of its extremely low isotopic abundance, very little 3He will be
available from natural sources on the earth's surface. Another source of aHe is
the decay of tritium, according to Equation 7 abo_e, which is used for weapons
and other purposes. It is likely that the total amount of aHe which will be
available early in the 21st century will be no more than a few hundred
kilograms, an amount barely adequate for one or two space missions.
Other potential :_ources of 3He include the decay of tritium specially
produced by fission reactors for space miss':ons; and semi-catalyzed DD
reactors, following the suggestion ofM_ley, et al. [ref. 13], which are part of a
ground-based fun:on economy using DD reactions. The most promising source
oi"large amounts of aHe appears to be heating regolith on the lunar sure'ace
which has been implanted with 3He over geological ages by the solar wind
[refs. 7, 14]. It appears that essentially unlimited amoun_ of 3He would be
available for space missions from sources on the lunar surface, or the
atmospheres of the outer planets or their satellites which have retained light
elements in their atmospheres.
Safety and Environmental Factors
Affecting Confinement Concept
In this section some of the factors which affect the choice of confinement
concept will be examined. This includes both the choice between inertial and
magnetic fusion energy', and also the choice among magnetic containment
concepts.
The most effective fusion propulsion system, which minimizes the size of
the radiator required ,and the total mass, is the direct fusion rocket shown on
Figure 2 [refs. 1,2]. In this propulsion system, the escaping unreacted fuel and
reaction products are expanded in a magnetic nozzle, where they are mixed
with cold propellant to achieve a unidirectional plasma jet with a spread of
velocities, but an optimum mean exhaust velocity [Ref. 15]. If an an mtronic
fusion reaction (one which produces few neutrons from all sources, including
side reactions) is used, and if all the unburned reaction products appear in the
exhaust jet, relatively little heat energy remaiv_s on board the spacecraft to be
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disposed of by massive radiators. This direct propulsion system may either
require a very high burn-up fraction, or waste what might be a scarce or
expensive fuel
DIRECT FUSION ROCKET
ENERGYFORM:
PARTICLEKINETIC JETKINETIC
j }--------
WASTEHEA I PROPELLANT
I
On Figure 3 is shown one of many schemes put forward for space
ropulsion using inertial fusion, In this concept, a laser or charged particle
earn ia fired at a DT pellet which explodes, after which the propellent and
some of the filler material bounces off-a pusher plate, located at a sufficient
distance that significant ablation does n_t occur. This pusher plate is
connected to the vehicle by springs and dashpots, -,hich absorb and transmit
momentum to the spacecraft. Sometimes a magnetic field, which "catches" the
charged reaction products, replaces the pusher plate in this concept. The
repetitive explosion of Lhese fusion microbombs can yield high accelerations,
and short interplanetary round trip times. In most inertia} fusion schemes, 14
MeV neutrons. 3.5 MeV heliurn-4 ions, radiation, and other materials are
emitted isotropically (except those that intercept the pusher plate) into space.
NUCLEAR PULSE PROPULSION USING
FUSION HICROBOMBS
LASEROR
MeV RELATIVISTIC
ELECTRONS 14 MeV ELECTRONBI:AM i
NEUTRONS i
/3.5 MeV He' _ PllSHERPIA.TE ,'
,q / \
, _ _ -_e--:____--._-.,- .... {I / I
_ _;'__',,_ WA T 1_ / /"
, ', ...... spacev,IC: E/
I f_Ut ILIAN/ .,_ IG/-'_-- L _____/"
L DTMICROBOMB
_-SHOCKARSORBERS
L FILLfR
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Over the past 20 years there have been numerous design studies of space
propulsion systems using inertial fusion. Most of thes(_ studies are of direct
fusion rocker of the type indicated schematically on I_igure 3, in which the
initiating ener_J pulse is provided by lasers or particle beams. There have
been ¢ew if any studies of inertial fusion systems for the primary purpose of
generating electrical power in space. The large recirculating power flows
usually required for inertial fusion, and the resulting mass penalties, may
have discouraged detailed studies of inertial fusion for such applications.
Another characteristic of most engineering design studies of inertial
fusion propulsion systems is that, as indicated in Figure 3, the neutrons and
much of the radiant energy are unshielded arid escape freely into the space
environment. There appear to be few, if any, eDgineering design studies of
inertial fusion space propulsion systems which fully shield the neutron,
charged particle, and radiant energy fluxes produced by the explosion of the
pellets.
Another problem with inertial fusion _pace propulsion systems is that
investigations of burn dynamics with clasS.'L''_.d computer code_ indicate that
the energy gains of advanced fuels are insu,_cent to marginal for a pellet burn
[Ref. 7]. Two unclassified oapers [Refs. 16, 17] on advanced fuel inertial
confinement show that a special pellet clesi_l (AFLINT) may be capable of
burning the DD reaction, although with very high recirculating power flows
[Ref. :7}. For such r_asons as these, published desigt,, studies assume the DT
reaction) the very high reactivity of which assures an adequate pellet burn. If
inertial fusian _ystems in space are 1;faired to the DT reaction, the
implications of this are ratber serious for the o_erali propulsion system. One
must be c,:ncerned about the risk inherent in the tritium fuel, as described
previous % and one must avoid contaminating either the atmosphere or the
magnet, osphere w_th radioactive tritium in the event of an accident, or escape
of the tritium as unburned propellent from the reactor.
Conclusions
--Magnetic vs Inertial Fusion in_Space
For environmental and safety reasons touched upon in the above
discussion, it ap_ _ars mat inertial fllsion is at a disadvantage with respect
magnetic fusion for application to space power and propulsmn systems.
Inertial fusion systems may he restricted to the I,T reaction, raising the
possibility of contamination of the atmosphere and/or the magnetosphere with
radioactive tritium; and it appears difficult to shield the neutron, the chargcd
particle, and _.he radiant energy fluxes that result from the e::plosion of the
"' _ " _ r m i _, _. _. • _ •pellets wltt-,ou_ paymt_ a la ge asspena,ty for I)_ me,t_al tuslon systems. It
appears diflicult to burn advanced fuels with reduced neutron produc*Jon in
inertial fusion systems because of the relatively low reactivity of advanced
157
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fuels relative to the DT reaction. Unclassified studies of advanced fuel inertial
confinement [Refs. 16, 17] have demonstrated the feasibility of a fusion burn,
although with high recirculating powers [Ref. 17]. F_lrt.h_,r ,e_e__rch ie needed
_, _,,_:,,,_u-a_e reauy attractive ICF performance w,th advanced fuels. On
present evidence, it appears that safety and e_vironmental considerations
make inertial fusion systems relatively a mm-. difficult prospect for space
applications than magnetic fusion reactors which, if they have low
recirculating power flows, can burn advanced fuels.
Choice of Fusion Reaction for S_p_ace Applications
Considerations discussed in Ref. 12, Chapters 8 and 9, indicate that at
kinetic temperatures below 100 keV, only the DT, catalyzed DD, and D_He
reactions are capable of producing power densities in the range of 1 to 10
"_egawatts per cubic meter at number densities, conff ",merit times, and
_.etic temperatures which are modest extensions of current DT tokamak
research, if it is desired to minimize the transportation, handling, and leakage
of trihum into the environment, that leaves only the catalyzed DD and DaI-Ie
react.ions. If it is further desired to minimize the radioactivation and shielding
mass associated with high levels of neutron production, that leaves only the
DaHe reaction. On present evidence, it appears that the DaHe reaction is the
all-around best choice ibr space applications of magnetic fusion energy.
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